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ABSTRACT 
 
The most dynamic feature of the South Korean economy in the late 20th century is the emergence of 
the country as a major destination for foreign investors. However, because the market has been 
closed to outsiders, for almost two decades, except for certain industries, Korea is as yet an 
unknown entity among the global business community.  This acts as a deterrent to market entry. It 
is evident that among the economic and business literature there has been limited emphasis on the 
cultural and other complications such as the position and influence of the chaebol (a group of 
mostly family owned conglomerates in Korea) that exists for foreign businesses in the Republic of 
Korea.  This paper attempts to crystallize some of the key cultural issues, examine their relevance 
and highlight some consequences of the lack of understanding of these cultural issues for the 
world's leading multinational corporations wishing to enter the Korean market.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The most dynamic feature of the Korean economy since the late 20th century has been the 
emergence of the country as a major destination for foreign investors. Since the early 
1990s, more than 1,000 foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) have established 
operations in fields ranging from consumer products to high-tech industries. In particular, 
the 1997 financial crisis has given rise to a vastly changing market environment. For the 
first time in modern Korean capitalism, issues like transparency, accountability and 
relaxed government intervention have been major themes running through the local and 
foreign business community.  
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the Republic of Korea (ROK)1, since the opening of its 
market to the outside, is increasing apace.  It rose from a meagre US$27.4 million in 1987  
to more than US$32 billion in 1996. Dramatically, the late 1990s saw the sudden 
emergence of Korea as a major recipient of foreign capital for both strategic and non-
strategic industrial areas, ranging from consumer products (e.g., alcohol, tobacco, 
cosmetic, textiles, etc.) to telecommunications. Further investment de-restrictions coupled 
with a lower value of the currency (won), the declining status of the chaebol and the 
 
1 The term Republic of Korea (ROK) is used interchangeably with Korea in this paper. 
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increased government capacity resulting from the 1997 financial crisis may make 
investments more attractive. In particular, Korea has attracted around US$31.5 billion 
between 1997 and 2001, ranking it the sixth in the Asia-Pacific region (EIU, 2002: 3).  
This implies that the Korean market is rapidly changing and opening to outsiders offering 
opportunities to maximise market benefits in Korea.  However, because the Korean market 
has been closed to outsiders, for almost two decades, except for certain industries, Korea is 
as yet an unknown entity among the global business community.  This acts as a deterrent 
to market entry. 
 
It is widely believed that there are few success stories on the foreign side, but more 
unhappy experiences (Reid & Lee, 1998; EIU, 2002).  Nonetheless, there is little serious 
analysis of the experiences of foreign companies in Korea.  Clearly, success in an 
unfamiliar foreign market requires an in-depth understanding of the major sociopolitical 
and economic changes at work, in particular the mechanisms which cause the rapid growth 
of significant markets such as the ROK.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Much of the previous literature on foreign investments in Korea has concentrated on the 
business climate (Chu & MacMurray, 1993; EAAU, 1999: 99–118). The literature 
concerned have advanced a range of explanations, from trade policies investment trends and 
patterns (Holloway, Islam, Mcbeth & Moffert, 1996; White, 1996; Kum, 1996; Park & 
Kang, 2000; Shin, 2000), comparative analyses (Kim, 1996; Chaponniere & Lautier, 
1995), general statistics  on the micro and macro economy of the nation (Lee, 1996a; 
Ignatius, 1996; Sohn, 1996, OECD, 1998) to the corporate culture of Korean businesses 
(Lee, 1996b; Robinson, 1996; Halsey, 1996; Chung, Lee & Jung 1997; Reinebach, 1998) 
and institutional and cultural approaches (Wilkinson 1996; Song & Meek, 1998). Yet, it is 
evident that among the economic and business literature there has been limited emphasis 
on the cultural and other complications that exist for foreign businesses in Korea. Clearly, 
an understanding of the above issues is significant.  
 
A recurring issue for foreign companies, as raised by 48 percent of interviewees, is the 
position and influence of the chaebol in the Korean economy.  In terms of aggregate 
concentration measured by sales, the top ten chaebol accounted for 75 percent of total 
sales in 1995.  The big four, Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo and LG, accounted for one-third 
of total sales and nearly 60 percent of total Korean exports in 1995.  Unfortunately, after 
following the exhortations of the Kim Young-Sam government to expand exports, these 
big chaebol now have debts of four times equity on average and excess production 
capacity.  Therefore, the chaebol present obstacles as well as opportunities.  They may 
hinder the entrance of foreign companies into the market as a result of their hold over 
distribution systems but on the other hand their size and vision may present the foreign 
company with great market opportunities.  
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METHODOLOGY 
 
This paper is grounded on a study that is, in part, based on fieldwork performed in the 
ROK during 1998 and 1999.  By systematically probing the experiences of foreign 
companies, it identifies emerging trends as well as some salient findings based on the 
experiences of foreign companies that have developed a business presence in the ROK.  
Approximately 80 personal interviews were conducted in Seoul with senior executives of 
foreign companies, many at the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) level and key personnel in 
government agencies. Interviewed companies reflected a variety of sources of ownership:  
British, French, German, Japanese, New Zealand, United States, etc., as did the nationality 
of the interviewees.  Many were Koreans but the sample also repressed cultural bias as the 
interviewees reflected a variety of national origins. 
 
TABLE 1 
NATIONALITY OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
Nationality No. of 
interviewees 
Nationality No. of 
interviewees 
Australia 6 German 6 
Canada 1 Hong Kong 2 
British 10 Japanese  6 
Danish 1 Korean 29 
Dutch 1 New Zealand 2 
Egyptian 1 Swedish 3 
French 3 USA 9 
 
TABLE 2 
COUNTRY OF OWNERSHIP 
 
Country of 
ownership 
No. of 
organizations 
Country of 
ownership 
No. of 
organizations 
Australia 2 Korea 2 
Austria 1 Netherlands 1 
Denmark 3 New Zealand 2 
EU 1 Sweden 3 
Finland 1 Switzerland 1 
France 4 United Kingdom 9 
Germany 13 USA 28 
Hong Kong 3   
Italy 2   
Japan  5   
 
Interviewees were invited to reflect on their experiences of the Korean market in 
comparison to their experiences of other international markets.  In this way, they were 
encouraged to reveal their perceptions and learning based on their experiences with the 
ROK market: 
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The major issues impacting their businesses in Korea are as follows: 
 
• Distinctive characteristics of the ROK market in comparison to other Asian high 
growth economies such as China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan; 
• Preoccupations and realities of the ROK market; 
• Korean business culture as a barrier and opportunity in doing business; 
• Koreans as consumers compared to other international markets;  
• Political economy of the Korean market – opportunities and constraints; and 
• Competitive climate including customer and supplier behavior.  
 
Interviews were taped, transcribed and subsequently deconstructed. In this way, according 
to the principles of grounded theory, the findings and any theory would emerge from the 
data rather than been forced from some prior hypotheses (Bailey, 1987; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). This data was then analysed qualitatively with the NUD*IST (Non Numerical Data 
Indexing Search Text) software.  This entailed categorising respondents' comments 
according to their subject matter.  The program was used to arrange all comments on 
related issues or particular themes to be viewed together.  These comments were cross-
referenced with the interviews so that, it was apparent which firm and which industry the 
respondents were from. Issues to be examined in this study include: 
 
• The nature of the Korean opportunity including some insights into political, 
competitive and obstructive factors;   
• The business potential for MNCs in Korea;  
• The positive attitudes that are manifest regarding the economic and business 
potential in the ROK; and 
• The reason why the ROK is still regarded as one of the toughest territories to 
invest despite its outstanding economic achievement. 
 
    
THE KOREAN MARKET: PERCEPTION AND REALITY 
 
According to a survey in the 1998 Far Eastern Economic Review and Asia Business 
Review (Far Eastern Economic Review 1998), Korea was ranked as the least favorable 
destination among Asian countries in which to invest and afforded the second greatest 
level of social instability.  The poll conducted in early 1998, among business leaders in ten 
Asian countries, marked Korea as the second highest in terms of political risk. This 
corroborates with the International Institute for Management Development's country 
competitive index (2000).  The institute's 1999 report ranked Korea 38 out of 47 major 
countries for competitiveness. Korea ranked far behind other Asian economies like Japan 
at 16, Taiwan at 18, Malaysia at 27, China at 29 and Thailand at 34.   
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A recent survey (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1999) of 103 MNCs in Korea revealed a 
generalized perception of the Korean market among MNCs. The  section on major 
impediments in doing business in Korea received the best response of all sections, with a 
response rate of 100%.  Each participant was asked to rank eighteen items, which appeared 
to be difficult areas for foreign investors doing business in Korea, in order of severity   
(e.g. 18-most difficult, 1-least difficult).  Two thirds of the respondent companies believed 
strong Korean nationalism, foreign exchange risks, bureaucracy and difficulty of obtaining 
information from government and regulatory bodies as major impediments in doing 
business in Korea.  Other major impediments in doing business include: the chaebol's 
dominance in the domestic market, Korean business culture, poor outlook for economic 
growth and corruption. 
 
TABLE 3 
MAJOR IMPEDIMENTS IN DOING BUSINESS IN KOREA 
 
Impediments Major factor 
(%) 
Minor factor 
(%) 
Korea's strong nationalism 50% 25% 
Bureaucracy and difficulty of obtain information 
from government and regulatory bodies 
46% 30% 
Foreign exchange risk 42% 34% 
Korean business culture 37% 13% 
Corruption 38% 17% 
Regulatory controls over movement of capital 
(including repatriation of profits) 
33% 13% 
Poor outlook for economic growth, recession, 
post crisis 
33% 13% 
Anti-competitive practices in tendering 29% 21% 
Poor intellectual property protection 30% 11% 
Chaebol's dominance in domestic markets 25% 21% 
Lack of infrastructure 21% 17% 
Difficulty in obtaining finance 21% 17% 
Lack of motivation among Korean employees 21% 13% 
Communication (language) 13% 42% 
Slowness in the reform process 13% 29% 
Lack of information about potential opportunities 13% 21% 
Political instability 13% 13% 
High company and personal taxes 8% 17% 
 
Note:  Score ranked by foreign management for major factor ranges from 18 to 14 and for minor from 13 to 9.  
 
Source: East Asia Analytical Unit, 1999. 
 
However, this research highlights an air of positivism, despite the reputation of the ROK 
as a difficult and uncompetitive market.  In fact, the majority of the interviewees (75%) 
were bullish about their prospects in this market. Clearly there is a contrast between the 
Korean market reputation and MNC behavior.  This is supported by data on the annual rate 
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of FDI (EAAU, 1999: 79–98, Michell, 1999; SERI, 2000), which demonstrates that while 
market conditions and the challenges of business development in the ROK may be 
extremely competitive, funds continue to flow in. In particular, the chaebol's desperate 
need for cash, which will boost mergers with and acquisitions (M&As) of Korean firms by 
foreign firms, and their size and vision may present foreign companies with their greatest 
market opportunities (Young, 1998; Moskowitz, 1998).  
 
TABLE 4 
MOTIVES BEHIND COMPANY'S INITIAL DECISION  
TO INVEST IN KOREA 
 
Description of motives in the initial decision to invest % 
Already a major market and local presence important 66 
As a part of company's globalization strategy  38 
To explore a new market  16 
To establish a beachhead for market expansion  12 
Approached by Korean partner  4 
 
Note: Companies were given opportunity to provide more than one motive behind 
their initial decision to invest in Korea. Thus, response percentages greater 
than 100. 
 
Source: East Asia Analytical Unit, 1999. 
 
The table above shows that 66% of the respondents cited Korea as a major market and its 
local presence important as a major motive in their initial decisions to invest in Korea.  38% 
of the companies cited their investment in Korea as part of their companies' globalization 
strategy.  Exploring new opportunities in a foreign market was also cited as a major motive 
behind their decisions to invest in Korea. This table reflects the companies' general 
perception of the Korean market in the investment planning process.  The market (47 million 
people) and size of the Korean economy coupled with its potential turned out to be some of 
the most persuasive factors in the companies' actual decisions to invest in the ROK market. 
Yet, there are some critical issues to be addressed. 
 
In assessing opportunities in the ROK market the boundaries must be sufficiently broad.  It 
is insufficient to gauge market size and be swayed by consumers' growing purchasing 
power.  In some ways the ROK defies simplistic classification.  For example, the nature of 
the relationship of the government to the chaebol may be beyond the experience of some 
analysts.  Reflecting a generally held view, the CEO of one of the MNCs in Korea 
provided insight of his experience in Korea: 
 
"You've got to listen, and watch what's going on first.  As a market place, there are a lot 
of relationships here, which could be long-term based on alumni.  People could come 
from the same school, or could have long-term supply relationships.  There are a whole 
host of reasons why people do business here, which are not necessarily transparent". 
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The above statement is general and reflects common sense to anyone with an intention to 
explore a foreign market.  But what was found from this study is that most problems and 
investment conflicts are rooted in the MNCs lack of knowledge of the ROK's peculiarities 
with respect to its economy and culture.  Indeed, common sense is the most neglected form 
among major foreign investors.  This is why the majority of interviewees emphasized 
aspects of the Korean business culture, as key issues, such as the nature of the chaebol.  
These are the most expensive learning experiences for the sample companies. 
 
   
COMPETITIVE CLIMATE 
 
Around three-quarters of the interviewees stressed the extreme nature of the competitive 
environment.  Although many of them had previously occupied postings in other Asian 
markets including Japan, they regarded Korea as singular. There are a number of 
distinguishing characteristics in the style of competition, for example the absence of the 
notion of win: win situations.  Customers are often not satisfied until their supplier is 
"bleeding".  This has implications for premium priced high quality products and service 
providers and tends to mediate toward commodity non-differentiated strategies that are not 
justified in the high cost Korean regime.   
 
 
THE CHAEBOL  
 
Despite recent changes in Korea's industrial development paradigm (Kim, 1999), the 
country is to a large extent a command economy and the mechanism by which economic 
commands are effected is the chaebol.  Until very recently, the Korean government chose 
to favor the chaebol over most of its business affairs as a means of accelerating the 
national priority of fast economic growth.  This tight collusion between government and 
business inevitably created inequality between the chaebol and small and medium-sized 
companies, between social classes, and between industrial sectors (Choi, 1998).  It may be 
true that such a protection was necessary at the initial stages of economic development.  
However, this practice has continued over the last three decades.  
 
These companies (chaebol) exist in a similar way to the pre Second World War zaibatsu 
groups in Japan, a highly centralized family controlled system. They exercised 
monopolistic and oligopolistic control across product lines and industries. The chaebol, 
like the zaibatsu are prestigious, powerful and influential and their corporate behavior 
largely determines the competitive climate (Yoo, 1991).  Their size and government 
protection have enabled the chaebol to borrow at advantageous rates.  They also take 
extended credit and thus delay payments by considerable periods through the device of 
issuing promissory notes to their suppliers.  This has resulted in the chaebol having 
numerous advantages that have rendered them resistant to certain types of competitive 
threats. The chaebol have always been on the top of the government priority list.  In turn, 
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the chaebol prioritized quantitative rather than qualitative growth. For example, by 1996, 
the total number of subsidiaries owned by the top thirty chaebol were 668 in almost every 
industrial sector, ranging from primarily consumer goods, automobiles, finance, 
machinery, electronics, engineering, construction, cosmetics to insurance and securities.  
Among those 668 subsidiaries, 55 were controlled by Samsung, 46 by Hyundai and 48 by 
LG respectively (New Industry Management Academy, 1997). 
 
The Distribution System 
  
The distribution system in the ROK reflects some of the characteristics peculiar to the 
Korean market that pose difficulties for foreign investors.  As indicated above, a term 
frequently revisited by CEOs during interviews is the chaebol.  Retail outlets in Korea are 
controlled by the chaebol, creating vertically integrated linkages between manufacturers 
and retailers.  The top thirty chaebol, such as Hyundai, Daewoo, Ssangyong, LG and 
Samsung dominate retail sectors, ranging from cosmetics, toiletries to cars and computers.    
The chaebol are unwilling to sell a competitor's products on the same shelf in the same 
store, thus effectively locking out the foreign products.   That is why it is always a big 
challenge for foreign companies in the ROK to compete with the chaebol. 
 
The majority of the interviewees, particularly from consumer product industries dealing 
with fashion and accessories indicated difficulties in dealing with department stores.  Most 
of their brands are sold via these outlets.  But all major department stores in Korea belong 
to the chaebol.  The Han Hwa Group owns Galleria and Samsung owns Shinsegye.  A 
Japanese-Korean conglomerate, that has a very close relationship with the chairman of 
Samsung, owns Lotte.  This illustrates the chaebol's influence over distribution.  Stories 
abound of major brand owners being ejected from their department stores space 
concessions with only cursory notice.  Thus, finding the appropriate distributor with good 
relationships capable of winning shelf space and retaining it, is always a big challenge and 
one of the key ingredients of success.   
 
A Bridge to the Market? 
 
Most of the MNCs in Korea are in one way or another linked to the chaebol. British 
Telecom (BT) can list among its major customers domestic shipping and transport 
companies, like the Cho Yang Shipping Co., Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. and Korea 
Marine Transport Co.  BT has established a global network, dubbed "Concert," to attract 
more corporate customers.  The state-run giant, Korea Telecom has recently concluded its 
merger with the United States based MCI.  AT&T is quickly growing in the domestic 
market after winning an order to build Samsung's intra-group network "SASCOM" (Mail 
Economic Daily, 1997).  The United States foremost telecom carrier has also strengthened 
its marketing strategy in order to access other big corporate entities, like Hyundai and LG.   
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In the fashion industry, many leading international brands are closely connected with the 
chaebol groups, which arguably dominate distribution channels in the ROK market.  For 
example, Giorgio Armani is affiliated with Shinsegye International, Versace with Jiyeon 
Trading and Gucci is associated with a Top 40 chaebol group, Daesung.  Marks & 
Spencer's franchise partner is a Daesung JV company.  The establishing of a good partner 
relationship with the chaebol often leads to a position that helps cope with the fierce 
endemic competition.   
 
Active participation of the chaebol groups in the MNCs' business indicates that the 
chaebol are now focusing more on businesses which are more complementary than they 
were in the past.  It also implies that although Korean consumers and the industrial buyers 
alike are tough they are also pragmatic.  The Koreans' quick adaptation of the idea of mass 
merchant discount outlets supports this view.  Therefore, we argue that access to the 
knowledge of how foreign players and their businesses are integrated with Korean 
companies, especially with the chaebol, will facilitate the development of a foreign 
venture.   
 
 
MARKET CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS 
 
One of the key features in the recent development of the Korean market, particularly after 
the Olympic Games (1988), has been the explosion of tertiary industries, in particular 
those in the consumer and service sectors.  Despite the economic downturn in the early 
1990s and the financial crash in 1997, there has been a rapid expansion of medium 
industries like department stores and discounting wholesalers.  This in turn has served to 
accelerate the influx of foreign capital, particularly since the government's full opening of 
its market to foreign consumer products in 1989 and partial opening of the service 
industries (e.g., hotel, real estate, telecommunications and financial institutions). For 
example, world leading telecom carriers, including BT, AT&T Co. and Global One are 
shoring up efforts to raise their share in the domestic telecommunications market.  The 
domestic communications market, including system maintenance and repair, are now 
estimated at around 200 billion won (about US$221 million). Korea's telecommunications 
market has shown the fastest growth among the Asia-Pacific rim countries with an annual 
rate of 50 percent (Mail Economic Daily, 1997).  
 
Some factors will explain this phenomenon.  Firstly, the country's rapid industrialization 
and high rate of savings over the last three decades has enabled the nation to become the 
second largest consumer market (excluding Japan) in Asia and is worth more than US$214 
billion.  Secondly, the rapid nature of rising disposable income levels has boosted the 
growth of domestic consumption.  Last, but not least, the changing attitudes of Korean 
consumers towards foreign-made products have become more favorable and this has 
played a part in internationalizing the ROK market.  What then are the major changes in 
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Korean consumer behavior in the 1990s, with the opening of the domestic market to 
outsiders?   
 
Korean Consumers:  Singular or Universal? 
 
The globalization of markets and the internationalization of brands are a late twentieth 
century phenomenon.  A common factor across Asian markets is the ever-increasing level 
of buying power coupled with westernization. Associated with these shifts is the 
concomitant erosion of traditional cultural values.  For example, the ROK like China and 
Japan is very much a relationship-oriented market (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 
1997), and yet the consumer is becoming much less traditional.  Demographic-based data 
support this view.  Almost 60% of the ROK population is under the age of 35 years.  The  
20–35 group accounts for more than 28% of the total population of 45 million (National 
Statistical Office, 1997).  These young people possess high disposable income as well as a 
willingness to purchase readily.  It is easily recognizable in eating out behavior, the 
patronage of trendy bars or restaurants and window-shopping.  Like other countries, young 
people in Korea wear "Guess" jeans, smoke "Marlboro" and wear baseball hats back to 
front.   
 
In particular, there are some ironies between the Korean consumer perception towards 
foreign products and actual consumption behavior.  A culturally constructed mind-set 
prevails and this is reflected in consumption behavior.  It is particularly evident in the 
arena of internationally renowned brands.  For example, more than 90% of the 
interviewees confirmed that Koreans possess a high degree of brand consciousness and are 
often willing to pay more to acquire so-called "badge brands".  Indeed, many interviewees 
agreed that the more expensive the product, the easier it is to sell.  In other words, the 
image of expensive goods equals perception of quality in Korea. 
 
This is also true in the luxury goods industry.  Since 1992 when the Korean government 
opened the domestic market for foreign brands, many international brands like Louis 
Vuitton, Calvin Klein, Giorgio Armani, Valentino, Gucci, Chanel, have enjoyed high sales 
levels.  Apart from the Koreans possessing strong brand-name consciousness, growing 
levels of purchasing power and the wider use of credit cards have also contributed to this.   
 
An important thing to be addressed here is the importance or the impact of TV advertising 
on Korean consumers.  The reason being that the main shoppers in Korea are women, 
particularly housewives since a large number does not work, although this trend is slowly 
changing.  The cultural mind-set that women should stay at home, taking care of the 
family and house, is still prevalent.  This means that most young women after  graduation, 
work until they get married.  At home, TV is their main entertainment.  They watch a great 
deal of television with soap operas, talk shows and variety shows being very popular.  
They are the main targets for a number of consumer products.  Thus, TV advertising is 
very powerful and critical for a firm's successful communication strategy. 
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Brand Consciousness:  A Cultural Lag? 
 
Korean brand conscious culture can be traced back to its cultural and historical roots.  
Historically and culturally, there has been a very strong emphasis on dignity and prestige 
in the society.  Further, this kind of cultural character is often depicted in television epic 
dramas and historical novels.  This reflects the strong hierarchical order within the family, 
government and society in general.  In the Western world, seldom do they refer to their 
brothers as the "elder brother" or the "younger brother", whereas in Korea to do otherwise 
is unthinkable.  This tradition stems from the strong influence of Confucianism.  Brand-
consciousness enables Koreans to differentiate the upper and lower classes and to show 
prestige and dignity.   
 
This Confucius-oriented behavior applies to schools, army and every part of the social 
structure.  Koreans always tend to put a strong emphasis on external appearances like 
houses, cars, and clothing.  So they tend to seek out the best and the most expensive items.  
And interestingly, the most expensive items are usually the first to sell out.   
 
Although some Korean products, like electronic goods from Samsung or LG are 
comparable with foreign products, the Korean consumer often prefers the foreign version. 
In recent years, despite the government's strong frugality campaign against luxury foreign 
products, the Koreans' strong preference for foreign goods is still prevalent.  As one CEO 
observed, "Koreans are very proud of themselves (5000 year-old history, culture and 
economic success) on the one hand, but on the other, they are obsessed with previously 
forbidden pastures like, the so-called, sumptuous foreign goods".  However, despite 
changes and bright prospectives of the ROK market in terms of market size and consumer 
affluence, there are still some other warning signals to be flagged in  dealing with Korean 
customers and consumers, which include the chaebol and the government. 
 
Koreans:  Tougher Customers? 
 
Unlike other Asian markets like Taiwan where one can find thousands of small to medium 
scale firms in manufacturing and distribution, the Korean market structure is relatively 
simple.  This is due to the particular nature of the Korean distribution system, which is 
heavily dominated by a small number of chaebol groups.  This situation, of course, 
provides challenges and opportunities.   
 
One of the challenges, is the toughness of Korean customers especially in negotiating with 
foreign companies.  While this toughness in negotiations is universal, the unanimous 
understanding among the interviewed MNCs is that Korean customers are the toughest in 
the Asia-Pacific Region. Korean customers in general are price/cost-sensitive and 
demanding.  The toughest challenge for foreign players in dealing with the chaebol groups 
is rooted in their lack of appreciation of product value, especially in terms of an extended 
product that may include warranties and other extras.  In almost every negotiation, the 
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priority is price rather than product value.  In particular, it is always difficult to sell a 
value-added product at the lowest price.  Despite its increasing awareness of the so-called 
globalization in the 1990s, there is still suspicion and a lack of openness towards 
foreigners and foreign companies.   
 
This implies that in leading a company in the right direction in the ROK, it is necessary to 
focus on certain key issues.  One obvious requirement is to be a low-cost producer or a 
low-cost seller.  Since price is so important, if a company can't achieve low-cost sales, 
supported by low-cost production, it will encounter difficulties.  Alternatively the recent 
success of network marketing companies in Korea such as Amway, Nu-Skin and Sunrider 
supports this line of argument by demonstrating the value of side stepping the need to 
negotiate with powerful distributors.  Amway now claims 30% of the toothpaste market 
share in Korea without putting products on retailers' shelves.  Moreover, when Nu-Skin 
first ventured into Korea, 75,000 people applied to be distributors.  Equally important, 
establishing and maintaining a good relationship with the chaebol is one of the key 
elements in leading a successful venture.  One of the interviewed CEOs provides a view in 
this respect, "as far as suppliers are concerned, connections and contacts are very 
important.  And if you have to put categories for quality, price and relationship, the 
relationship is 50% of the deal.  After that is price, followed by quality". 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Despite the fact that the Korean market is as singular as Korea's economic and political 
development over the last three decades there is a paucity of usable information in the 
public domain of foreign company experience in the Korean market. For example, there is 
no other place like Korea, where the economy is influenced and controlled by the chaebol.  
As discussed in this paper, the chaebol's big hand over almost every business and 
distribution system, is not comparable with any other economy.  This is a significant 
aspect of the Korean market. Recognition or disregard of this highly invisible area often 
acts as an important barometer for the firm's fate in a foreign operation; an issue 
sometimes neglected in the Korean market entry analysis.  
 
This paper has offered a much-needed contribution to Korean related literature, which is 
heavy on generalizations and myths but light on case-based analysis.  Throughout this 
paper, qualitative insights have been provided into how specific political, cultural and 
institutional relations affect foreign investment behavior in Korea.  Not surprisingly, a 
majority of interviewees cited that most multinational conflicts and related issues are 
found in the company's ignorance of the impact of the dynamic nature of Korean 
capitalism on multinational businesses.  It is clear that this fusion between political 
economic analysis and qualitative research delivers a more effective understanding of the 
overall process of developing a foreign business presence in the Korean market.   
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